Abstract-Consider an OFDM based, multi-hop underwater acoustic sensor network with M + 1 underwater sensing nodes that report their sensed data to a sink node (on water surface). A malicious node Eve attempts to eavesdrop the ongoing communication between a sensor node and the sink node. To this end, this work performs joint optimal node selection for data forwarding and sub-carrier power allocation (across OFDM sub-carriers) to maximize the secrecy capacity on each hop. Specifically, the optimization problem formulated is a mixed binary-integer program, which is solved via dual decomposition method. Since this is the first work on secure routing, we compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the classical depthbased routing (DBR) scheme in simulations. The simulation results show that: i) the proposed scheme outperforms the DBR scheme (i.e., the performance gap between the two schemes increases) with increase in the transmit power budget of the sensor nodes, ii) the proposed scheme benefits from the increase in the density of sensor nodes (while the DBR scheme fails in such situation).
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication between underwater acoustic sensor networks (UWASN) nodes is susceptible to various attacksincluding passive attacks (such as eavesdropping) as well as active attacks (such as impersonation)-due to the broadcast nature of the acoustic medium [1] . Traditionally, communication systems have been secured via cryptographic measures (e.g., RSA, AES) which provide security at the higher layers of the protocol stack. But such measures are fallible as demonstrated by researchers in recent times who have managed to break into the crypto-based security measures employed by the IEEE 802.11/Wi-Fi systems [2] .
The limitations of the cryptography based security measures have motivated the researchers to focus on the alternate approach of physical layer security (PLS)-an informationtheoretic approach whose foundations were laid down by Shannon in his landmark paper [3] . Later, in an influential work [4] , Wyner introduced the wiretap-channel, and defined secrecy capacity as the maximum achievable secure rate (secret bits/sec) between two legal nodes, in the presence of an eavesdropper. Since then, secrecy capacity maximization has become a de-facto metric to evaluate the performance of communication systems facing an eavesdropping attack.
This work considers the problem of data forwarding/routing from a sensor node to the sink node when a (passive) malicious node Eve is present in the close vicinity. Eve listens to ongoing communication between a sensor node and the sink node, thereby potentially decoding confidential information fully or partially. The shortest data forwarding path from a sensor node to the sink node may still consist of multiple hops; therefore, the communication on each hop needs to be protected from passive attack by Eve.
This work does joint optimal node selection for data forwarding/routing and power allocation across the orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) sub-carriers at each hop such that the secrecy capacity at each hop is maximized. The optimization problem at hand turns out to be a mixed binary integer programming problem, which is known to be nonconvex and NP-hard. Therefore, we resort to a sub-optimaldual decomposition method based approach. However, we note that the duality gap of the proposed dual decomposition based solution approaches zero as the number of OFDM sub-carriers grows large [5] .
A. Related work
The recent surge of interest in multi-hop UWASNs has led the researchers to design a plethora of routing/data forwarding protocols, each with a different design objective, to address the unique set of challenges that UWASNs pose (see the survey article [6] and the references therein for more details). There are few works on secure routing in UWASNs though [7] , [8] , which design routing protocols to detect a wormhole link in an UWASN. Zhang et. al. [7] detect a wormhole link through a set of neighbor discovery protocols based on the direction of arrival (DoA) of the acoustic wave. A secure, anonymous routing protocol is presented in [8] which does two-way signature-based authentication under some assumptions (e.g., attack node has no information about the location, ID etc. of the legitimate nodes). However, while the works [7] , [8] deal with wormhole attack through crypto-based measures, this work counters a passive eavesdropping attack through PLS.
From a different perspective, there are few more works that deal with the passive eavesdropping attacks in singlehop UWASNs [9] , [10] . The work [9] considers a 2-D region (a disk) comprising multiple UWASN nodes (and one Eve node) distributed according to a Poisson point process. The authors then consider a critical region around Eve to compute the probability that the eavesdropper is able to intercept the communication ongoing within the network. Huang et. al. [10] consider a situation where a node (Alice) transmits to another node (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper node (Eve); authors propose that the Bob node exploits the block transmissions nature and large propagation delays of the arXiv:1807.01556v1 [cs.IT] 4 Jul 2018 Nevertheless, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first work which addresses the problem of secure routing (i.e., maximizing the secrecy capacity at each hop) in a multihop UWASN, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper.
Outline. Section II presents the system model. Section III proposes a novel secure routing method that performs joint optimal node selection and power allocation (across OFDM sub-carriers) to maximize the secrecy capacity on each hop. Section IV provides simulation results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an UWASN comprising M + 1 underwater sensor nodes (so-called Alice nodes) that report their sensed data (via OFDM scheme with N sub-carriers) to a sink node S on the water surface (see Fig. 1 ). Let A = {A 0 , A 1 , ..., A M } represent the set of Alice nodes. Without loss of generality, we assume that the node A 0 has to report its sensed data to S. Let D i represent the depth of the node A i from the water surface, while d i represents the distance of node A i from A 0 . We assume that a passive eavesdropper (Eve) is present in the close vicinity of the UWASN. We further assume that the Eve is not very closely located to the sink node 1 .
III. JOINT OPTIMAL SUB-CARRIER POWER ALLOCATION & DATA FORWARDING NODE SELECTION FOR SECRECY CAPACITY MAXIMIZATION
We consider a situation where the direct link between A 0 and S does not exist. Therefore, the problem at hand is to design a routing protocol to route the data of A 0 to S, while protecting the data (at each hop) as much as possible from the eavesdropping attack by Eve. To this end, we propose that A 0 should forward its data to that relay node A i ∈ C (C = A ∪ S | A 0 ) whose secrecy capacity (SC) is maximum among 1 This assumption is needed for the proposed secure routing algorithm (to be described in the next section) to terminate. This assumption is reasonable because the sink node is typically a very powerful node equipped with proximity sensors (and thus, is capable of detecting a malicious node nearby).
all other candidate helper nodes. The SC of A i (summed over all the N OFDM sub-carriers) is defined as follows:
where
j ) is the signal to noise ratio (SNR) on j-th sub-carrier at A i (Eve). In plain words, SC (i) is the channel capacity of A i less the channel capacity of Eve.
The SNR on the j-th sub-carrier at A i is:
Similarly, the SNR on the j-th sub-carrier at Eve is:
where p j is the transmit power over j-th sub-carrier; B j (f ) is the bandwidth of the j-th sub-carrier. P L(d, f ) is the frequency-dependent path-loss between a transmit and receive pair with separation d, given (in dB scale) as [11] :
where ν is the so-called spreading factor, while α(f ) is the coefficient of absorption, given as [11] :
N (f ) is the frequency-dependent power spectral density (PSD) of the ambient noise (comprising of noise contributions from turbulence, shipping, waves, and thermal noise) [11] :
where N 1 and τ are the experimental constants. Note that the above approximation of the PSD N (f ) of ambient noise holds for frequency range 1 − 100 kHz only [11] .
To select one such node for data forwarding whose secrecy capacity is maximum among all other candidate helper nodes, A 0 formulates the following optimization problem:
s.t.
where η i ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ C; η i = 1 (η i = 0) implies that the helper node A i is selected (not selected). The first constraint of the optimization problem in Eq. (7) ensures that for any candidate helper node A i , the total power allocated over the N sub-carriers should not exceed the total power budget P T of the sensor node A 0 . The second constraint ensures that only one node is selected for data forwarding at each hop.
The optimization program in Eq. (7) is a mixed binaryinteger program; we use dual decomposition approach to solve it. Regardless of convexity of the original problem, the duality gap between primal solution and dual solution is nearly zero provided that the number of OFDM sub-carriers is sufficiently large [5] . The dual problem is formulated as:
where D(λ) is the dual function, and λ > 0 is the dual variable/Lagrangian multiplier. The dual function is given as:
where L(.) is the Lagrangian function, given as:
and
j ) is the net noise power observed by A i (Eve). The expression in the argument of log 2 (.) above is obtained through logarithmic property, i.e., log a − log b = log( a b ). Now, for any selected helper node A i , Eq. (9) becomes: 
∀i ∈ C, then the optimal solution to Eq. (11) is:
where D i is the depth of node A i . By plugging
back into Eq. (9), we are left with the problem in Eq. (8) . To this end, we use the sub-gradient method, which iteratively solves Eq. (8) according to the following control law:
where δ is the step size, and P alloc (m) = i∈C N j=1 η i (m)p j (m). The algorithm converges when P alloc (m) = P T .
The proposed method (when run on the first hop) is fully summarized in Algorithm 1. The Algorithm 1 is repeatedly invoked at each helper node to select the node for the next hop until the data reaches the sink node. 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS

A. Simulation Setup
The simulations were performed in MATLAB. We used the specification of a commercial OFDM modem (AM-D2000) by Aquasent [12] for simulation. Specifically, we assume an OFDM system with N = 1024 sub-carriers which span a bandwidth of 6 KHz (from 9-15 kHz). We deploy M + 1 number of legal nodes, and an Eve node according to a uniform distribution in a (vertical) square region of area 5000 * 5000 m 2 , under the water. We set ν = 1.5, N 1 = 50 dB, τ = 18 dB in Eqs. (4), (6) [11] . We assume that each sensor node knows the distance of Eve from itself. 2 The secrecy capacity SC plotted in each of the following figures is the minimum secrecy capacity among all the hops (after a routing path has been computed by the Algorithm 1). In other words, SC = min{SC 1 , ..., SC k , ..., SC K } where SC k is the secrecy capacity obtained by solving the optimization program in Eq. (7) at k-th hop (assuming that there are K hops in total. Furthermore, in all the results below, the benchmark used to assess the performance of Algorithm 1 is the classical depthbased routing (DBR) protocol [14] . Briefly speaking, for a sender node with data, the DBR protocol selects at each hop a relay node for data forwarding that has maximum depth among all the candidate helper nodes with depth greater than the depth of the sender node. Fig. 2 studies the impact of transmit power budget on secrecy capacity achieved for the proposed secure routing scheme and the benchmark under the scenarios of equal and optimal sub-carrier power allocation. For Fig. 2 , we set M + 1 = 10. We make the following observations: i) the secrecy capacity is a piece-wise linear/monotonically-increasing function of the total power budget P T ; ii) the proposed secure routing scheme (no matter the sub-carriers are loaded with equal powers, or, with optimal powers) outperforms the classical DBR scheme (for P T > 120 dBµ Pascals), with a margin that grows with increase in the transmit power budget; iii) the performance loss of the strategy of equal power allocation across the sub-carriers in comparison to the optimal power allocation strategy is very minimal (for both schemes, the proposed scheme and the DBR scheme). Fig. 3 investigates how secrecy capacity behaves as the density of legitimate UWASN nodes is increased. For Fig. 3 , we set P T = 110 dBµ Pascals. We learn that an increase in the density of legitimate nodes results in an increase in the secrecy capacity for our proposed scheme, and zero secrecy capacity for the DBR scheme. The reason for zero secrecy capacity for the DBR scheme is as follows: as the node density increases, it becomes very likely that the DBR scheme selects a node very close to Eve (at some hop) along the routing path which culminates in zero secrecy capacity.
B. Simulation Results
V. CONCLUSION
This work studied (for the first time) the eavesdropping attack on an OFDM-based, multi-hop UWASN. We performed joint optimal node selection for data forwarding and power allocation (across the OFDM sub-carriers) to maximize the secrecy capacity at each hop. The proposed scheme outperforms the DBR scheme as the transmit power budget of the sensor nodes is increased beyond 120 dBµ Pa. Finally, the proposed scheme benefits from the increase in the density of sensor nodes (while the DBR scheme fails in such situation).
VI. APPENDIX The Lagrangian associated with Eq. (7) is:
where µ j is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with p j . Now, applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) stationary conditions, i.e., ∂∆ ∂pj = 0, we obtain: (2) (Ω
Next, we apply KKT complementary slackness condition, i.e., µ j p j = 0. Then, for any p j > 0 we have: (2) (Ω
This leads to the following solution:
where a j = Ω 
